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IMMUNITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS FROM
LIABILITY IN TORT: LIMITATIONS
ON THE DOCTRINE.
The question of the immunity of charitable institutions
from liability in tort is one beset with difficulties. This con-
dition is caused not so much by the nature of the subject-mat-
ter as by the quite diverse and irreconcilable reasons assigned
by the courts for their conclusions. In dealing with this ques-
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tion, therefore, an attempt will be made to classify the various
cases and to contrast the reasoning of one class of cases with
that of other classes, and vice versa. The general rules of lia.
bility of charitable institutions for tort, as established by the
decisions, will be stated, and an effort will be made to show
the reasons, if any, for the adoption by the courts of rules re-
stricting or limiting, in certain cases, the application of the
general rules. As is usual when courts in different jurisdic-
tions have occasion to pass upon the same question, a contrar-
iety of opinion arises, and though the same result may
reached the reasoning employed is quite different. Perhaps
this difference in reasoning in the present instance is caused
to a great degree by the question of whether or not the defend-
ant is a charitable institution, the courts in some jurisdictions
hesitating to declare liability where there is any doubt con-
cerning the charitable character of the defendant.1
But as the question of this thesis deals with the immunity
of charitable institutions, as such, for liability in tort, no ef-
fort will be made to discuss what circumstances are deemed
necessary to constitute an institution a charitable institution.
These circumstances, however, may be gathered from quoted
excerpts of cases which appear subsequently. Further cases
in which liability has been declared solely because the defend-
ant was not a charitable institution, have been eliminated.
In a majority of the cases pertaining to this question the
defendant has been a hospital, and in making statements of
law the word "patients" is used, but inmates of reformatories
and other institutions as well as "persons injured" are includ-
ed by that word. Thus the law regarding the liability of a
hospital for injury to a patient is equally applicable to other
institutions that are not hospitals.
Also, the individual facts of cases will not be set forth,
except in certain instances, and no attempt will be made to
dwell upon the difference between a private charity and pu-
1. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294. Fire Ins.
Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624.
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blic charity, it being true that if the defendant is a charity,
its liability in either case is the same.2
At the outset, it may be said that the early English deci-
sions on the question of liability of charitable institutions for
tort, furnish no valuable precedent or workable rule applicable
to charitable institutions in America, and because of the di-
vergent reasoning employed therein, have been expressly re-
pudiated. 3 The American courts, however, from the earliest
tines have regarded charitable institutions as not liable for
their torts solely on the ground of public policy. 4 This is per-
haps the first reason adopted by the courts for holding char-
itable institution exempt from liability for torts committed by
their agents and servants. To permit the institution to be held
liable for the negligence or other torts of its officers or em-
ployees would be to authorize the diversion of the funds in-
trusted to it from the purpose for which they were given, and
hence defeat the intention of the donors.5 This is a defense
that has been successfully invoked by institutions when sued
for negligence of their agents or servants.
The doctrine of public policy may best be illustrated by
an examination of the cases in various jurisdictions, such as
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Perhaps the first case of
any importance to arise in Massachusetts was McDonald v.
Massachusetts General Hospital.6 The principle of immunity
laid do-wn in that case was that a public hospital operated as a
charitable corporation has no funds which can be charged
with any judgment which the plaintiff might recover except
those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the
hospital. This doctrine was again considered in Benton v.
Boston City Hospital, ' the decision resting on the fact that
2. Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 119.
3. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98. Glavin v. Rhode Island
Hospital, 12 R. I. 411.
4. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. Fire Ins.
Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624. Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed.
294.
5. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 258.
6. 120 Mass. 432.
7. 140 Mass. 13.
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the defendant was an agency of the city of Boston and that
defendant could not be held liable for negligence of its ser-
vants in the performance of a governmental function under-
taken by it. Apparently the principle of general immunity
of a charitable institution for liability in tort seems to have
been based originally on the governmental capacity of the per-
son sued. The principle that a charitable institution is not
liable for its negligence on the ground of public policy, how-
ever, has met with almost universal approval and has been
properly applied to defendants who were separate corpora-
tions not operated as governmental agencies or functions."
In the case of Farrigan v. Pevear, 9 defendant was held to
be a private charity and was said to stand in respect to liability
for negligence of its servants on the same plane as a public
charity and the reason advanced for the immunity of a public
charity from liability, namely, that the funds of a public hos-
pital are devoted to a charitable trust and that to subject
them to the payment of damages would be an unlawful diver-
sion of the trust funds, was really the authority for the de-
cision.
The doctrine of public policy has also been firm]y adopted
by the courts of Pennsylvannia. Like other courts, in the ear-
lier cases, the immunity of charitable institutions seems to
have been rested on the fact that the defendant was an instru-
mentality of the government and accordingly exempt from
liability, although some of the cases have stated the exemp-
tion as being due to the charitable nature of the defendant.
In the ease of Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 10 which was twice
before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court upheld
the immunity of the plaintiff in error on the ground that "the
8. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20. Abston y. Walton Academy,
118 Tenn. 24. Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School, 95 Ky. 251. Parks
v. Northwestern University, 218 I1. 381. Adams v. University Hospital, 122
Mo. App. 675. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408. Duncan
v. Neb. Sanitarium Benev. Ass'n. 92 Neb. 162. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital,
66 Conn. 98. Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555. Powers v. Massa-
chusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (Federal rule).
9. 193 Mass. 147.
10. 120 Pa. 624; 113 Pa. 269.
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duty of extinguishing fires and saving property therefrom
is a public duty and the agent to whom such authority is del-
egated is a public agent and not liable for the negligence of
its employes." This language plainly shows that the decision
rested on the fact that defendant was a governmental agency.
The court further said that to pay the judgment recovered
would amount to a misapplication of the trust funds. But in
a Massachusetts case, similar in facts to Fire Ins. Patrol v.
Boyd, the court arrived at an opposite conclusion, holding de-
fendant to be a private and not a charitable corporation and
liable for the negligence of its servants. 1  The doctrine of
immunity established in the case of Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd
has been followed in jurisdictions which maintain that a char-
itable institution is not liable for the negligence of its servants
on the ground that payment of damages would amount to a
diversion of the trust funds and thus be against public policy. 12
A Pennsylvania case which follows the Boyd case and empha-
sizes the immunity of charitable institutions from liability for
negligence is Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis.1 In that case
the court says :14 "It is a doctrine too well established to be
shaken, and as unequivocally declared in our own state as in
any other, that a public charity cannot be made liable for the
torts of its servants. The doctrine rests fundamentally on
the fact that such liability if allowed, would lead to a diversion
of the trust funds from the trust's purposes." This doctrine
has further been approved and affirmed in a recent federal
court case15 which recognizes the general immunity doctrine
as established by state court decisions in Pennsylvania. This
decision, though handed down by a federal court, is for prac-
tical purposes a Pennsylvania state case, as it strengthens the
principles laid down in the Boyd case.
11. Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 151 Mass. 215,
12. See note 8.
13. 227 Pa. 254.
14. p. 258.
15. Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Assn, 247 Fed. 639, certiorari denied,
38 Sup. Ct. 334.
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But, as efficacious as the public policy doctrine has been in
shielding charitable institutions from liability, it has not to-
tally protected them, and in some jurisdictions, if the institu-
ton sued has failed to exercise proper care in selecting its
agents, it is responsible in damages to the person injured, re-
gardless of its charitable character. This rule, which is known
as the qualified immunity rule, exempts charitable institutions
from liability for the torts of their servants provided they
have used due care in their selection."8 It is hard to ese, how-
ever, why a charitable corporation should be held liable for
ngligence in selecting its agents and not liable for the negli-
gence of agents carefully selected. 17 In either event liability
for negligence in the selection of servants may impair the
trust estate just the same as liability for the negligence of
servants, though, perhaps, less frequently.' 8 This reasoning,
of course, is designed to qualify the inviolability of trust
funds to the extent that damages may be allowed for the
negligence of servants. The direct result of such a course
would be to place charitable institutions on the same ground of
liability for torts as any other person or corporation, and
thus destroy their privileged immunity. The courts, however,
have never sanctioned or applied such reasoning, but have
consistently maintained the rule that charitable corporations
are not liable for the torts of their servants and agents when
they have exercised due care in their selection. Some of the
courts recognize the immunity of charitable institutions on the
ground of public policy, but at the same time seem to base their
decisions on the fact that the exemption of such institutions
16. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98. McDonald v. Mass. Get-
eral Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109
Fed. 294. Collins v. New York Post Graduate Med. School & Hospital, 66
N. Y. Supp. 106, 59 App. Div. 63. Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill.
381. University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564. Taylor v. Protestant
Hospital Asss'n. 85 Ohio St., 90. Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470. Mikota
v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Ia. 1378. Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24
Wyo. 408. Nicholson v. Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kan. 480.
17. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233. Basabo v. Salvation Army,
35 R. I. 22.
18. Hordern v. Salvation Army, supra.
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from liability for injuries occasioned by the negligence of
their physicians, surgeons, nurses, servants, and agents should
be limited to cases where there has been no negligence on the
part of the defendants in the selection or retention of such
persons. But the cases sustaining this doctrine seem to be
entirely inconsistent with the general proposition of the ex-
emption of charitable corporations on grounds of public pol-
icy. The ground for the non-liability for the torts of agents
or servants of charitable institutions, as stated before, is that
to pay damages for torts would be a diversion of the funds
from the purposes for which they were donated and that dam-
ages cannot be paid in such cases. While the courts recognize
this doctrine, they except cases where the agent or servant
was incompetent and there was negligence in his selection,
failing to observe that it would be as much a diversion of the
trust funds to pay damages for torts occasioned by negligence
in the selection of an incompetent servant as for any other
torts.19 But it seems that this rule regarding care in the se-
lection of servants, may just as well rest solely upon the
ground of public policy. Indeed, both reasons are discussed in
the cases, but the courts seem to prefer the ground of Idue
care in the selection of servants" as being more logical and
tangible than the vague ground of public policy.
There are a few cases, however, where the correlative state-
ment, to the effect that charitable corporations are liable
where they have failed to exercise due care in the selection of
servants and agents, has been used to assert the liability of
charitable corporations.20 One of the first cases to so hold
was Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 21 where the court in the
opinion said: "If the interne neglects to call the surgeon, his
neglect is the neglect of the corporation. Now the plaintiff
contends that this injury was such that under the rule a sur-
19. Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of Long Island, 135 App. Div.
839; reversed on other grounds, 203 N. Y. 191.
20. Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hos. Ass'n, 32 Utah, 46. St. Paul
Sanitarium v. Williamson (Tex. Civ. App.), 164 S. W. 36.
21. 12 R. L 411, 425.
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geon should have been immediately sent for, and that the in-
terne's neglect to do it cost him his arm. He also contends
that the corporation did not use proper care in selecting the
interne who was incompetent for his position, and thereby he
occurred the injury complained of." The court proceeds to
say that there are certain duties to patients which are cor-
porate duties, such as the exercise of due care in the selection
of competent attendants, and that the agent of the corporation,
whose dutiy it is to summon such attendants, is in such case the
agent and representative of the corporation, whose negligence
is considered to be that of the corporation itself. Incidentally,
it may be said that the Galvin case holds that the doctrine of
general immunity of a charitable corporation from liability
for damages on the ground of public policy as involving the
diversion of trust funds from the purposes of the trust, has
no logical foundation. But it is only natural that this case in
favoring a recovery for the plaintiff should condemn the pub-
lic policy doctrine. Yet the Rrode Island legislature subse-
quently saw fit to pass a statute holding charitable corpora-
tions exempt from liability for the negligence of their servants
and agents. 21 , A Massachusetts case goes to the other ex-
treme and denies the liability of a charitable corporation for
the negligence of its servants and agents regardless of whether
or not they were carefully selected. 22 It considers the language
of the court in the McDonald case, to the effect that a charit-
able institution is not liable provided it exercised due care in
the selection of its servants and agents, as merely "precau.
tionary," and states :23 "The correlative assertion, to the ef-
fect that there is liability of the hospital in cases where there
has been carelessness on the part of the managers in the selec-
tion of servants and agents, is neither expressed or implied."
This is rather an illuminating statement considering the fact
21-a. Gen. Laws of R. I., c. 213, sec. 38.
22. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (Mass.), 126 N. E. 392.
23. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; p. 394,
126 N. E. 392, supra.
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that in none of the cases dealing with this point is a similar
remark to be found. The case, therefore, seems to decide the
question of exemption of charitable corporations from liability
in tort upon the sole ground of public policy and renders use-
less the distinction that such an institution is only liable when
it has failed to exercise due care in the selection of its agents
and servants. The cases in Missouri on this question cling to
the doctrine of public policy, without recognizing the distinc-
tion above pointed out.24
Closely allied with the "due care in selection" rule, is a
supplemental rule regarding the relation the person injured
bears to the corporation. For instance, a charitable corpora-
tion is never held liable to a person who is a recipient of the
benefit of the charity at the time of his alleged injury.2 Some
of the cases deny the liability of a charitable corporation in
any event to pay damages for injuries arising from the neg-
ligence of its servants or agents, either to a patient or to a
third party, on the ground of public policy.26 The relation
side of this rule is best explained in Powers v. Massachusetts
Homeopathic Hospital, 27 where it is said: "It would be intol-
erable that a good Samaritan, who takes to his house a
wounded stranger for surgical care, should be held personally
liable for the negligence of his servant in caring for that
stranger.' Thus, the relation of the person injured to his
benefactor sometimes determines the liability or non-liability
of a charitable corporation for its torts. But it is well set-
tled that a charitable institution is not liable in damages to
one who is the beneficiary of its charity.-8 In some of the
24. Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479. Adams v. University Hospital,
122 Mo. App. 675. Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116. Nicholas
v. Evangelical Deaconess Home (Mo.), 219 S. W. 643.
25. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 125.
26. Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675. Whittaker v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116.
27. 109 Fed. 294, 304.
28. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233. Thomas v. German Gen-
eral Benevolent Society, 168 Cal. 183, 188. Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101
Mich. 555, 559. Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465.
234
Washington University Open Scholarship
[MhMU"ITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS FROM LIABILITY 235
cases29 the contention is made that a charitable institution
loses its charitable character when it accepts pay from a pa-
tient or inmate, and in the event of injury to such a person it
is answerable in damages. But the fact that the money de-
rived is applied to further the charitable interests of the re-
cipient, calls for the rejection of this contention. Where such
institutions are not charitable, however, and are maintained
for profit, they are liable for their torts the same as any other
person.3 0
But while one who is the beneficiary of the bounty of a
charitable institution may not hold it liable for personal in-
juries, a third person, not the recipient of its favor at the time
of his injury, may recover.32 In fact, nearly all the adjudi-
cated cases which have dealt with the question of the liability
of a charitable corporation to its servants or third parties for
injuries arising from negligence, have held in favor of the
plaintiffs. One of the first eases holding a charitable institu-
tion liable for injuries to its servants is Hewett v. Woman's
Hospital Aid Association.32  A nurse in the employe of the
defendant, a charitable corporation was placed by the super-
intendent in charge of a patient suffering from diphtheria, of
which the superintendent was aware, but neglected to notify
the nurse. The nurse contracted the disease, and for the in-
jury to her caused thereby brought suit. She was held en-
titled to recover. The defendant claimed exemption on the
ground of public policy, but the court deemed it a wiser appli-
cation of the rule to find for the plaintiff rather than to apply
29. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254. An attempt was made to
hold liable funds derived from patients who paid for their treatment and to ex-
clude the trust funds from liability. The contention was disapproved, the court
holding that "every dollar received by the defendant corporation is stamped
with the impress of charity." Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Assn. of Monon-
gahela City. Pa., 247 Fed 639.
30. Phillips v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co., 211 Mo. 419. Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Buchanan. 31 Ky. L. Rep. 722. Fontanella v. N. Y. Cent. R.
Co., 174 N. Y. Supp. 537. Richardson v. Carlon Hill Coal Co, 6 Wash. 52. Texas
& Pacific Coal Co. v. Connaughten, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642. But see Barden v.
Ad. Coast Line Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 318.
31. Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 19L Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital. 12 R. I. 411.
32. 73 N. H. 556.
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the rule against her. After discussing the duty of the super-
intendent to notify the nurse of the contagious disease and
contending that such duty is a non-delegabIe one, the court
says .28 "Since the property of the defendant is held for the
general purpose of maintaining a hospital without other spe-
cific limitation, it is no more exempt from being appropriated
to the payment of damages occasioned by the negIigehce of the
hospitaI than is the property of an individual, which he holds
for commercial or charitable purposes, for the consequence of
his negligence." The New Hampshire court apparently went
on the theory that charitable institutions are no more exempt
from liability than any other person and that immunity of such
corporations will only be recognized where a statute expressly
provides for such immunity. The court had a mass of author-
ity available to support the non-liability of the defendant, yet
it disregarded it and rendered a decision precisely opposite
to the interests of the defendant. The case, however seems to
be anomalous and has never been directly followed, though
dicta to the effect that the doctrine of public policy has no log-
ical foundation have been quoted by cases upholding the lia-
bility of charitable corporations for injuries occurring to third
persons.34
The doctrine that charitable institutions are liable for in-
juries to third persons through the negligence of their servants
and agents has been fully adopted in the Michigan case of
Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church.Y The church
was held liable to an employee of a contractor, engaged in dec-
orating the church building, for injuries sustained by reason
of the breaking of defective scaffolding furnished by the
agents of the church. The defendant relied upon the general
rule of public policy, but the court held that corporations ad-
ministering a charitable trust, like all other corporations, are
33. p. 566.
34. Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. 1. 22, 26. Kellogg v. Church Charity
Foundation. 203 N. Y. 191.
35. 147 Mich. 230.
296
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subject to the general laws of the land, and cannot claim ex-
emption from liability for the torts of their agents. In the
opinion decisions supporting the immunity of charitable in-
stitutions on the ground that a beneficiary of a charity cannot
recover are discussed and used as a negative argument in ar-
riving at the conclusion that such relation not having existed,
the defendant must be held liable on the ground of respondeat
superior. It will be remembered that in the Hewett case3 5a
the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant and not a third
person as in the Bruce case. The diverse reasoning in the lat-
ter case has weakened the decision according to a Missouri
case.36
In the New York case of Hordern v. Salvation Army,3T a
journeyman mechanic, who was engaged in making repairs on
a boiler on the premises of the Salvation Army, was allowed
to recover, it being held that the defendant was not relieved
from liability for the negligence of its agents and servants on
the theory that the rule of respondeat superior did not apply
to such corporation. This case was approved and followed in
Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of Long Island,38
where an ambulance driver of defendant, a charitable hospital,
negligently ran into plaintiff, the rule of respondeat superior
applying. Again, a charitable institution was held liable in
New York on the ground of respondeat superior where one of
its servants negligently committed a tort causing plaintiff,
who was working on defendant's property, to be injured.3 9
A Rhode Island case which unqualifiedly sanctions the lia-
bility of charitable institutions for injuries to third persons is
Basabo v. Salvation Army.40 There, plaintiff's intestate was
fatally injured by the negligence of defendant's servants in
the driving of its teams while engaged in the scope of their
35-a. 73 N. H. 556.
36. Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116 (Goode, J.).
37. 199 N. Y. 233.
38. 203 N. Y. 191, reversing 135 App. Div. 839. See also Van Ingen v.
Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 182 App. Div. 10 (N. Y.)
39. Gartland v. N. Y. Zoological Soc., 135 App. Div. 163 (N. Y.).
40. 35 R. I. 22.
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employment, and the court held the defendant liable on the
ground of respondeat superior. Incidentally, as in the Glavin
case,41 the doctrine of public policy was condemned.
From these cases it is apparent that liability of a charit-
able institution to servants and third persons for negligence
has been rested on the doctrine of respondeat superior, and
subsequent cases indicate that the courts have definitely de-
cided to adopt this doctrine. 2
A principle which has been mentioned incidentally in the
cases is that concerning the existence of a contract, between
the person injured and the charitable institution. Though a
recovery has been attempted on such a theory, none of the
courts have given serious consideration to it and in no case has
a recovery been allowed.43  In a recent Massachusetts case, 44
the plaintiff tried to recover on an alleged oral contract, but
the court held that there could be no liability in contract if
none existed in tort, and this statement rather tersely summar-
izes the law on this phase of the question. If the courts deny
a recovery in tort on the ground that such recovery would be
against public policy, certainly any contract attempting to con-
travene such public policy by establishing liability would be
void.
Having examined the various principles laid down by the
cases, it is necessary that a summary of our investigation be
made. The first principle discussed was that concerning pub-
41. 12 R. I. 411.
42. Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 182 App. Div. 10 (N. Y.).
Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101 McInerny v. St. Luke's
Hospital Ass'n of Duluth, 122 Minn. 10. Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital
Ass'n of Omaha (Neb.), 167 N. W. 208.
The courts of Massachusetts, in particular, refuse to apply the doctrine of
respondeat superior to charitable institutions. McDonald v. Mass. General
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147. Conklin v. John
Howard Industrial Home, 224 Mass. 222. Zoulalian v. New England Sanitarium
& Benev. Ass'n, 230 Mass. 102. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (Mass.),
126 N. E. 392.
43. Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 403. Duncan v. Neb.
Sanitarium Benev. Ass'n. 92 Neb. 162. Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n.
of Monongahala City, Pa., 247 Fed. 639. Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 39
App. Div. 624 (N. Y.).
44. Roosen v. Hospital (Mass.), 126 N. E. 392, 395.
Washington University Open Scholarship
MMUNI. Y OF CHA~rrABLE INSTITUTIONS FROM LLIBmrY 239
lic policy and the diversion of trust funds. The second con-
sisted of the qualified immunity rule, which, supplementing
the public policy doctrine, exempts charitable institutions from
liability for their torts if they exercised due care in the selec-
tion of their agents and servants. The third principle dealt
with the relation the person injured bore to the defendant, de-
ciding that if he was a recipient of the charity, he could not
recover. The fourth principle embraced the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, which constituted the basis of recovery of
strangers and servants injured by reason of the negligence
of agents and servants of the charitable institutions. The
fifth and last principle discussed dealt with the attempt to
hold a charitable institution liable on the ground that a con-
tract existed between the person injured and the defendant in-
stitution.
Our conclusion is that there is only one reason for the im-
munity of charitable institutions from liability in tort, and that
reason is that it is against public policy to allow trust funds
to be diverted for the payment of damages. This principle as
laid down in McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital45 and Fire
Ins. Patrol v. Boyd46 has been the real foundation for all the
decisions exempting charitable intsitutions from liability for
torts occasioned by the negligence of their agents and serv-
anfs. But the courts have attempted to disguise this principle
by basing their decisions on grounds providing for exemption
when due care has been exercised by the defendant in the se-
lection of its agents and servants; also on the ground that a
beneficiary of charity cannot recover merely because of the
relation it bears to the defendant. But, in either case, the
fundamental reason is that of public policy, which prohibits
a diversion of the trust funds for the payment of damages.
Directly opposed to the public policy doctrine, however, are
those cases supporting the doctrine of respondeat superior
with reference to liability to servants and third persons. This
45. 120 Mass. 432.
46. 120 Pa. 624.
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doctrine is the only substantial one that the courts have ap.
plied to refute the public policy doctrine, and circupnstances
indicate that it will continue to be recognized by the courts.' 7
Regarding the existence of a contract between the person
injured and the defendant institution, it may be said that, as
contracts made in contravention of public policy are void, and
as public policy is the main reason for immunity of charitable
institutions for liability in tort, any contract establishing lia-
bility would consequently be void.'8 But it is certain that this
principle can never be effectually applied to hold charitable
institutions liable in tort.49
The recent cases5" pertaining to the immunity of charitable
institutions for tort bring forth no new principles, and it may
safely be said that the courts will continue to exempt charit-
able institutions from liability for torts occasioned by the neg-
ligence of their agents and servants, on the sole ground of pub-
lic policy.
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